This paper presents some substantial relationships between the revealed preference test for a data set and the shortest path problem of a weighted graph. We give a unified perspective of several forms of rationalizability tests based on the shortest path problem and an additional graph theoretic structure, which we call the shortest path problem with weight adjustment. Furthermore, the proposed structure is used to extend the result of Quah (2014), which sharpened the classical Afriat's Theorem-type result.
Introduction
Given n observations of consumer's choices x k ∈ R ℓ + (for k = 1, . . . , n) and prices p k ∈ R ℓ ++ (for k = 1, . . . , n) of ℓ goods, we say that the data set O = {(p k , x k )} n k=1 is rationalizable if there exists a non-satiated utility function U : R ℓ + → R such that, for each k = 1, . . . , n, the choice x k is generated from the utility maximization problem with the utility function U and the budget constraint created by the price p k and the wealth level p k · x k . Afriat (1967) provided the first characterization of the rationalizability of data set O. The Afriat's Theorem says that a given data set O is rationalizable if and only if there is a solution U k , λ k > 0 (k = 1, . . . , n) to the following system of inequalities:
This system of inequalities is known as the Afriat's inequalities. Moreover, these conditions are also equivalent to the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP), which requires that there is no revealed preference cycle containing a revealed strict preference where revealed (strict) preference is defined on the set of observed consumption (Afriat 1967; Varian 1982 ).
Subsequent research focused on the properties of the data set that is rationalizable by a particular form of utility function, e.g., homotheticity (Varian 1983 ) and quasi-linearity (Brown and Calsamiglia form: the rationalizability, the feasibility of a system of inequalities (like Afriat's inequalities), and the no-cycle condition (like the GARP). Therefore, it is intuitive that these rationalizability problems may share some common mathematical structure. The main objective of this paper is to answer this intuitive question, and we present a unified framework for those rationalizability problems.
As noted by Piaw and Vohra (2003) , among others, the form (1) is related to a combinatorial optimization problem called the shortest path problem (SPP), which seeks shortest paths from a given start point to all the other points in a given network. It is known that the feasibility of the SPP is also characterized in a threefold way with the feasibility of a system of inequalities similar to (1) and the absence of negative cycles in the network. In this paper, we present a graph theoretic framework, which is a common structure of the various rationalizability problems, based on the SPP. 1 Our argument uses the standard SPP and a modified version of it that we define in this paper. We call the modified problem the SPP with weight adjustment (SPPWA), which asks whether there is a weight adjustment under which the adjusted network has shortest paths from a given start point to all the other points. We show that 1 
Kolesnikov et al. (2013) also demonstrated this relationship using the Monge-Kantorovich mass transportation
problem, which is a general mathematical framework containing the SPP. Here, we demonstrate the relationship in a complete manner using elementary graph theoretic arguments that do not require linear programming techniques or knowledge of the Monge-Kantorovich problem.
the feasibility of the SPPWA is characterized by a graph theoretic counterpart of the GARP, which is easily checked in empirical studies. Moreover, our graph theoretic argument allows us to extend the result of Quah (2014) , which concluded that one could always find a rationalization that is compatible with a given rationally extended preference ⪰ of the revealed preference relation ⪰ * , and hence provided a sharper conclusion than Afriat's Theorem. 2 In this paper, we present a graph theoretic counterpart of Quah's problem as well as the result using the SPPWA framework, and extend Quah's result so that we can treat both the integer observations and the real observations in a unified way.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, first, we introduce various rationalizability problems and review the characterization results. Next, we introduce the SPP and discuss its relation to the rationalizability problems. In Section 3, we formalize the SPPWA, present our first main result (Theorem 4), and apply it to the rationalizaiblity problems. In Section 4, we formalize the graph theoretic counterpart of the problem in Quah (2014) and present our second main result (Theorem 6), which extends the result of Quah (2014) using the SPPWA framework. Section 5 concludes this paper.
All proofs are consigned to the Appendix.
Rationalizability and Shortest Path Problem

Rationalizability Problem
Let X denote a consumption set (a subset of some finite dimensional Euclidean space). A budget set on X is defined as B = {x ∈ X | g(x) ≦ 0} for some (real-valued or integer-valued) function g defined
X for the k-th observation and x k is interpreted as the k-th observed consumption bundle such that
3 Let X denote the set of observed consumption bundles,
. Let U be a real-valued or an integer-valued utility function defined on a consumption set
In the following, we define various rationalizability problems by restricting the data set O and the utility function U in various ways. For this reason, we introduce some notation for the data set O. We say that a data set O is a linear budget data set (LB-data set) if 3 Because, in the following, we assume either X = R ℓ + or X = Z ℓ + , we shall often refer to a data set O without mentioning its consumption set X explicitly.
We say that f is strictly monotone if it satisfies x ≧ y and
Linear budget rationalizability is the most classical presented in Afriat (1967 Homothetic rationalizability (Varian 1983) requires that the rationalizing function to be homothetic.
Definition 2. A LB-data set O is homothetic rationalizable (H-rationalizable) if there is a non-satiated homothetic utility function
Quasi-linear rationalizability (Brown and Calsamiglia 2007) requires the data set to be extended so that the extended data set is rationalized by a quasi-linear utility function.
Definition 3. A LB-data set O is quasi-linear rationalizable (Q-rationalizable) if there are non-negative
and a wealth level
. . , n, and LB- 
n, is rationalized by a quasi-linear utility function
General budget rationalizability (Forges and Minelli 2009) considers the data set with possibly nonlinear budgets.
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Definition 5. A GB-data set O is general budget rationalizable (GB-rationalizable) if there is a monotone and continuous utility function
Now, we review the characterization results. In essence, these results are threefold: the rationalizability, the feasibility of a system of inequalities, and a no-cycle condition. First, the Q-rationalizability and the H-rationalizability are characterized as follows.
5 A utility function U : R ℓ + → R is homothetic if it is a positive monotonic transformation of a function that is homogeneous of degree 1; that is, if U (x) = f (g(x)) where g(x) : R ℓ + → R is homogeneous of degree 1 and f : R → R is positive monotonic. 6 Polisson and Quah (2013) and Forges and Iehlé (2014) also considered rationalizability problems in the indivisible goods settings. 7 A utility function U : Z ℓ + → Z is discrete concave if, for any x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ∈ Z ℓ + where m ≦ ℓ + 1 and any rational numbers λ 1 ≧ 0, λ 2 ≧ 0, . . . , λm ≧ 0 where ∑ m t=1 λt = 1 and Matzkin (1991) and Chavas and Cox (1993) also considered non-linear budgets settings, which are special cases of the setting of Forges and Minelli (2009) . See also Quah (2014) .
Theorem 1 (Varian 1983; Brown and Calsamiglia 2007). Suppose that O is a LB-data set and S
Then, the following three conditions are equivalent:
(ii) There is a feasible solution (U k ) n k=1 ∈ R n to the following system of inequalities:
Note that, for the H-rationalizability, this result is an equivalent version of the original characterization result of Varian (1983) . As mentioned in Varian (1983) , we take the log values of the original characterization conditions. Indeed, Condition (ii) is the log version of the feasibility condition of the original system of inequalities with the form
. . , n) and Condition (iii) is the log version of the homothetic axiom of revealed preference (HARP), which has the form
It is clear that these conditions are equivalent to each other.
For the LB, GB, and LBI-rationalizability characterizations, we first define the revealed preference relation and the GARP. For a given data set (iii) The data set O satisfies the GARP.
Note that, for the LBI-rationalizability, the GARP condition is not equivalent to the simple utility maximization behavior. Instead the GARP is equivalent to the utility maximization and the cost effi- 9 The original definition of the GARP was based on the revealed preference relation ⪰ * * , which is the transitive closure of the direct-revealed preference relation ⪰ * (Varian 1982) . However, the original definition is equivalent to that defined here, which is also referred to as the cyclical consistency condition from Afriat (1967 In the next subsection, we shall see that these rationalizability conditions are characterized also by the feasibility of particular instances of the SPP. Indeed, it is known that the feasibility of the SPP is characterized in a threefold way: the feasibility of the SPP, the feasibility of a system of inequalities, and a non-negative cycle condition. The latter two conditions are actually generalizations of Conditions
(ii) and (iii) in Theorem 1 and hence, we can characterize the rationalizability also by the feasibility of the SPP.
Shortest Path Problem and Rationalizability
The SPP asks for the shortest directed paths from one vertex to each of the other vertices in a given directed graph with weighted edges. Consider the examples in Figure 1 . Both graphs consist of the same vertex and edge sets, namely, five vertices V = {a, b, c, d, e} and eight edges E = Formally, a directed graph is a pair G = (V, E) where V is a finite set and E is a subset of the ordered pairs V × V . We call an element v ∈ V a vertex and an element (v, u) ∈ E an edge. (2013) characterized it by assuming the existence of an implicit divisible good in the sense that the data set can be extended in a similar way to the quasi-linear rationalizability of Brown and Calsamiglia (2007) . In contrast, Forges and Iehlé (2014) characterized the simple utility maximization behavior in the integer observations setting by modifying the GARP to the discrete axiom of revealed preference (DARP), which is a relaxed version of the GARP in the integer observations setting. 11 In this paper, we only consider simple graphs. That is, we assume that there are no loops or parallel edges in
sequence of vertices and edges
A shortest path from vertex s to vertex v is a s-v path that has the minimum length over all s-v paths.
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The following theorem is a known characterization for the feasibility of the SPP. For completeness, we present a simple proof of this characterization in the Appendix. See Murota and Shioura (2013) and Korte and Vygen (2012) for more detailed discussions. (
(iii) There is no negative length cycle in the graph G with respect to weight ℓ.
A vector π that satisfies Condition (ii) above is called a feasible potential. In the above examples, the graph on the left has a feasible potential (π(a), , we can construct a directed graph and associate it with weights generated from the data set O. 14 The directed graph G = (V, E) is constructed by introducing a vertex for each consumption bundle x k ∈ X and an edge for each pair of distinct indices (
If we take the weights ℓ Q : E → R and ℓ H : E → R to be
where p k and x k are the prices and quantities that define the budget sets of the LB-data set O. Then,
we have a SPP characterization of the rationalizability problems. (We omit the proof as it is obvious from Theorem 1 and Theorem 3.) 12 Note that we use the word weight or length even if ℓ((v, u)) or ℓ(P ) is negative. 13 It is interesting that almost the same form of the no-cycle condition appears in the mechanism design literature (Rochet 1987 ). Rochet's result concerns the rationalizability of a public decision function in a quasi-linear setting. The problem asks, for any arbitrary given decision function, whether there is a monetary transfer function with which the decision-transfer pair has the truth-telling property for a given agent equipped with a parameterized quasi-linear utility function. He showed that the rationalizability of a given decision function for a given agent is characterized by a non-positive cycle condition based on the agent's parameterized quasi-linear utility function and the decision function (Theorem 1, Rochet 1987). 14 Koo (1971) also investigated the graph theoretic representations of revealed preferences.
Proposition 1. Let O be a LB-data set and S ∈ {Q, H}. Let G = (V, E) be defined by (2) and
ℓ S : E → R be defined as (3) . Then, the following conditions are equivalent:
(iii) There is no negative length cycle in G = (V, E) with ℓ S : E → R.
(iv) There are shortest paths from x 1 to every other vertices in G = (V, E) with ℓ S : E → R.
For the LB, GB, and LBI-rationalizabilities, the arguments are the same and straightforward. Indeed, the correct SPP instance is clear if we compare the feasible potential condition of the SPP, (ii) in Theorem 3, with Afriat's inequalities of the rationalizabilities, (ii) in Theorem 2. Formally, for any S ∈ {LB, GB, LBI}, we consider the weight function for each S-data set as follows.
where K = R if S ∈ {LB, GB} and K = Z otherwise, and g k are functions that define the budget sets of the S-data set O. (2) and ℓ S (λ) : E → K be defined as (4) . Then, the following three conditions are equivalent:
Proposition 2. Suppose S ∈ {LB, GB, LBI} and O is a S-data set. Let K = R if S ∈ {LB, GB} and
(ii) There is a feasible solution, (U k ) n k=1 ∈ K n and λ ∈ K n ++ , to the following system of inequalities:
(iii) The data set O satisfies the GARP.
(iv) There is some λ ∈ K n ++ such that the directed graph G with the weight ℓ S (λ) : E → K has shortest paths from x 1 to each of the other vertices.
(v) There is some λ ∈ K n ++ such that the directed graph G with the weight ℓ S (λ) : E → K has no negative length cycle.
Again, we omit the proof for Proposition 2. However, note that for the LBI-rationalizability, the weight is integer-valued;
, and hence, the Afriat's inequalities condition is equivalent to the integer feasible potential condition in Theorem 3.
As shown in Proposition 1, the Q-rationalizability and the H-rationalizability are actually characterized by particular instances of the SPP. However, as shown in Proposition 2, the LB, GB, and LBI-rationalizabilities are characterized by a modified problem. The modified problem asks if there is a weight adjustment λ ∈ R n ++ (or λ ∈ Z n ++ ) under which the graph with the adjusted weight
has shortest paths from a given start point to the other points. In the next section, we formalize this modified problem with graph theoretic apparatus and characterize its feasibility. Through this argument, we can develop a graph theoretic counterpart of the GARP, which characterizes the feasibility of the modified problem.
Rationalizability and Shortest Path Problem with Weight Adjustment
Proposition 2 shows that we can characterize the LB, GB, and LBI-rationalizabilities using a modified SPP. The modified problem asks if there is a weight adjustment
++ ) under which the graph with adjusted weight λ v ℓ ((v, u) ) has shortest paths from a given start point to the other points. We call this modified problem the SPP with weight adjustment (SPPWA). Note that the adjustment λ never changes the signs of the weights ℓ((v, u)) because λ ≫ 0. Additionally, note that the adjustment λ v > 0 is identical for all the edges from the same vertex v.
Consider the examples in Figure 2 . Both graphs consist of the same vertex and edge sets, five vertices That is, examples is the existence of a negative length cycle that consists of only non-positive edges. Indeed, we can characterize the feasibility of the SPPWA using this condition. The following theorem is our first main result.
be a directed graph with n vertices and m edges.
Let ℓ : E → K be a weight function. Suppose that there is a path from vertex s ∈ V to each of the other vertices
Define a subset E np of the edges E as
Then, the following conditions are equivalent:
There is a vector λ ∈ K n ++ such that the graph G with the adjusted weight ℓ(λ) has shortest paths from s to each of the other vertices v.
(iii) There is a vector λ ∈ K n ++ such that the graph G with the adjusted weight ℓ(λ) has no negative length cycle. 
16
We now return to the rationalizability problems. By Proposition 2, the LB, GB, and LBIrationalizability problems are characterized by particular instances of the SPPWA. Formally, the directed graph is defined as the same as (2), i.e., V := {x
. . , n and k ̸ = k ′ }, and the weight and the adjusted weight functions are defined as follows: for all S ∈ {LB, GB, LBI}, and for any S-data set O and any
where K = R if S ∈ {LB, GB} and K = Z otherwise, and g k are functions that define the budget sets of the S-data set O. Then, Proposition 2 and Theorem 4 imply the following proposition. Because the strong connectivity of a pair of vertices is an equivalence relation, we can decompose the set of vertices, V , into equivalence classes by the strong connectivity relation. This decomposition is called the SCC decomposition of the directed graph. Note that we use the term SCC of a directed graph to describe the vertex sets that decompose V into the SCC decomposition and the subgraphs that are induced by each of such vertex sets. 16 Condition (v) can be checked easily using the SCC decomposition algorithm (e.g., STRONGLY CONNECTED COMPONENT ALGORITHM, Korte and Vygen 2012). Hence, as shown in Proposition 3 below, we can easily test the rationalizability of the economic data set. This procedure was also proposed by Fujishige and Yang (2012) and Nobibon et al. (2015) for the LBI and LB-rationalizabilities, respectively. 
Remark 1: Under the language of preferences, the graph
graph theoretic representation of the direct-revealed preference relation ⪰ * on the finite set
and so, if we construct a directed graph 
This section investigates a graph theoretic structure of the LB, GB, and LBI-rationalizability. In other words, we recover Afriat's Theorem-type results by a graph theoretic framework. However, Afriat's Theorem (for the LB-data set setting) and the Forges-Minelli Theorem (for the GB-data set setting)
were extended by Quah (2014) for more sharper results. The result says we can rationalize any rational completion of the revealed preference relation and implies that no preference that is consistent with the data set O can be eliminated by rationality. In the next section, we further recover this sharper result based on the SPPWA framework and extend Quah's result for integer observations (for the LBI-data set setting).
Rationalizability of Consistent Preferences and SPPWA
The Quah's Theorem
is a GB-data set. We call a binary relation ⪰ on a set of observed consumption bundles X = {x k } n k=1 a preference relation (or a rational relation) if it is reflexive, transitive, and complete. We say a relation between x k and x
and a relation between x
A preference relation ⪰ is said to be a consistent preference with the direct-revealed preference relation ⪰ * (or, with the data set O) if it satisfies the following two conditions:
17 In words, a consistent preference relation is a rational extension of the direct-revealed preference relation, which preserves the direct-revealed strict preferences as strict preferences. Note that condition (i) implies
′ and a consistent preference also preserves any direct-revealed indifference relation. Finally, we say that the revealed preference relation ⪰ * (or the data set O) admits a consistent preference if there is a consistent preference with it.
As noted in Proposition 2 of Quah (2014), the data set O admits a consistent preference if and only if it satisfies the GARP, and in particular, any data set with a consistent preference can be rationalizable.
The following result, which was shown in Quah (2014), further says that any consistent preference on X can be extended to a rationalizing preference.
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Theorem 5 (Quah 2014, Theorem 2). Suppose that a GB-data set
admits a consistent preference ⪰. Then there is a monotone and continuous utility function U : R ℓ + → R that satisfies the following two conditions:
, and
He shows this result by showing the following Lemma, which we focus on in the next subsection. 
Lemma 1 (Quah 2014, Proof of Theorem 2). Suppose that a GB-data set
. . , n, and
where g k are the functions that define the budget sets of O.
As noted in Remark 1 of Proposition 3, the graph G np of the SPPWA constructed from the data set O is a graph theoretic representation of the direct-revealed preference relation ⪰ * . Hence, it is intuitive that a problem asking whether there is a feasible solution of the SPPWA that preserves a rational extension of G np is a generalization of the above rationalizability problem of Quah (2014). In the next subsection, we present this problem with graph theoretic apparatus and extend the result of Quah (2014). 17 As noted in Quah (2014) , the consistency of a preference relation that we have defined here is equivalent to the one that is defined by the conditions (i) and (ii) with the revealed preference ⪰ * * and the revealed strict preference ≻ * * , instead of the direct-revealed preference ⪰ * and the direct-revealed strict preference ≻ * . 18 For consistency in terminology, we state Quah's Theorem based on the Forges-Minelli-type general budget rationalizability setting. Hence, in the presented result, the rationalizing utility function is monotone and continuous, instead of strongly monotone and continuous as in the original Quah Theorem (Theorem 2, Quah 2014).
SPPWA with Consistent Rational Extension of G np
Suppose we have an instance of the SPPWA, G = (V, E) and ℓ : E → K, where K = R or Z. We say that a graph with the same vertex set V , G r = (V, E r ), is complete if for any pair of vertices v, u ∈ V there is at least one edge (v, u) ∈ E r or (u, v) ∈ E r , and is transitive if it satisfies that for any pair of edges such that (v, u), (u, w) ∈ E r there is the edge (v, w) ∈ E r . A graph G r = (V, E r ) is rational if it complete and transitive. 19 A rational graph G r = (V, E r ) is consistent with (G, ℓ : E → K) if the following two conditions are satisfied:
Note that a preference relation ⪰ on X = {x k } n k=1 in the previous subsection corresponds to a rational graph G r = (X , E r ) where
in the current framework. Hence, intuitively, an edge (v, u) ∈ E r indicates that v is at least as good as u. Note also that if we define (G, ℓ : E → K) as in (2) and (5), and G r as in (6) (ii) There is a consistent rational graph G r = (V, E r ) with the instance (G, ℓ : E → K).
Finally, we state our second main result. It gives a graph theoretic generalization of Quah's Lemma. 19 We say that a graph is rational without the reflexivity, i.e., we implicitly assume that there are loops (v, v) ∈ E for all v ∈ V whenever we say that a graph G = (V, E) is rational. However, we do not need these loops for the results and/or analysis and hence, we do not mention them any further. we define a utility function U :
Theorem 6. For any instance of the SPPWA, G = (V, E) and ℓ : E → K, with a consistent rational
) is a solution of Afriat's inequalities obtained by Theorem 6 then, it LBIrationalizes the data set O. Moreover, it is known that this utility function satisfies that U (x k ) = U k for all k = 1, . . . , n. Hence, from Condition (ii) in Theorem 6, the utility function U clearly preserves the consistent preference ⪰ represented by G r , which is defined as in (6) . Therefore, Quah's Theorem is extended for the integer observations setting.
Remark 2:
The implication "(iv) ⇒ (ii)" of Theorem 4 follows from Proposition 4 and Theorem 6, and it follows that, in particular, the existence of a feasible solution of the SPPWA preserving a consistent rational graph G r of (G, ℓ : E → K) is also equivalent to all conditions in Theorem 4. 
where g k are the functions that define the budget sets of the LB, GB,
, which is constructed from the data set O as in Proposition 3, and "(
is contained in the set of edges of H κ . 21 Note that SCCI ∈ [0, 1] for any data set. This index has a natural interpretation: the ratio of the weight of irrational parts (negative weight SCCs) of the data set over the entire weight of the revealed preference relation. Moreover, it has an O(n 2 ) time algorithm: compute SCCs of G np using the SCC decomposition algorithm and compute SCCI defined by (7) . Hence, based on Proposition 3, SCCI may be a new valid and computationally feasible goodness-of-fit measure for the GARP.
negative length cycle, the length of a s-v path P ′ generated by removing K from P is no more than the length of P . That is, ℓ(P ′ ) ≦ ℓ(P ). Continuing this procedure until P is reduced to a simple s-v path P , we still have ℓ(P ) ≦ ℓ(P ). However, because P * is the shortest length simple path from s to v, we must have ℓ(P * ) ≦ ℓ(P ). Therefore, ℓ(P * ) ≦ ℓ(P ) holds. Hence, P * is a shortest s-v path.
Proof of Theorem 4
As previously mentioned, the equivalences (i) ⇔ (ii) ⇔ (iii) are consequences of Theorem 3. Hence,
we prove the remaining equivalences in the following. 
Take an arbitrary adjustment λ ≫ 0. Then, the weight of the cycle with respect to the adjusted
Thus, the graph G has a negative cycle with respect to the adjusted weight ℓ(λ). Because the adjustment λ ≫ 0 is arbitrary, there is no λ ≫ 0 such that the graph G with adjusted edge weight ℓ(λ) has no negative length cycle (i.e., Condition (iii) does not hold). (ii)" is also a consequence of those. However, as shown in the proof of Theorem 6 below, an algorithm given in the proof of Theorem 6 can be used to compute a solution (π, λ) of any feasible instances of the SPPWA. Hence, the proof of Theorem 6 can be applied to show "(v) ⇒ (ii)" in Theorem 4 directly.
Proof of Proposition 4
(i) ⇒ (ii): Suppose that the graph G np = (V, E np ) has no negative length cycle with respect to the weight ℓ : E → K. Then, form Theorem 4, we have a feasible solution of the SPPWA, (π,
Define a graph G r = (V, E r ) in the following way
Then, since K = Z or R are totally ordered, it is clear that G r is a rational graph, i.e., complete and transitive. Moreover, G r is consistent with the instance (G, ℓ) . Indeed, since (π, λ) is a feasible solution of the SPPWA, we have u) ) ≦ 0, and hence
and hence (v, u) ∈ E r and (u, v) / ∈ E r from the definition (8).
(ii) ⇒ (i): Suppose that, there is a consistent rational graph G r = (V, E r ) with the instance (G, ℓ).
Suppose also that, to the contrary, graph G np = (V, E np ) has a negative length cycle with respect to the weight ℓ : E → K, i.e., a cycle in G np that contains a negative weighted edge ℓ((v * , u * )) < 0. 
Proof of Theorem 6 (and Proof of "(v) ⇒ (ii)" in Theorem 4).
In the following, we show that proofs for Theorem 6 and for the implication "(v) ⇒ (ii)" in Theorem 4 can be done by an almost the same argument based on an algorithm we define below. For this reason, we denote G sub = G r or G np . Here, we assume that G sub is a consistent rational graph with the SPPWA following two properties:
Case 1: G sub = G r . First, we show that (i) holds. Suppose, to the contrary, v, u ∈ H κ and ℓ ((v, u) ) < 0.
Then we have (v, u) ∈ E np and hence, from the consistency of G r , we also have (v, u) ∈ E r and (u, v) / ∈ E r . However, because v and u are in the same SCC, H κ , there is a path
Therefore, by transitivity of G r , there must be an edge (u, v) ∈ E r , which is absurd. Next, we show (ii). 
For the time being, our goal is to show that, in either of the cases K = R or K = Z, there are real
with Condition (i) in Theorem 6 and, in addition, Condition (ii) in Theorem 6 if G sub = G r . For this purpose, let E p and E n denote the positive edges and negative edges of (G, ℓ), respectively: u) ) > 0} and
We can compute numbers (π, λ) ∈ R n × R n ++ , which satisfies Conditions (i) and (ii) in Theorem 6 by the following four-step algorithm:
Step 1: Compute the SCC decomposition, H 1 , . . . , H d of G sub . Here, H κ are assigned a topological order by their subscripts κ = 1, . . . , d.
Step 2: Let P and N be numbers such that
and
Step 3 
Step 4 
-
In the following, we show that the numbers (π, 
In particular,
We show this claim by mathematical induction argument on κ. Because P > 0, the base case κ = 2 is clear. Indeed, from (11) and µ 1 = 1, it follows
Moreover, because N < 0 and ϕ 1 < ϕ 2 , it follows
Next, assume that we have (14) and (15) for κ (where κ ≧ 2), and µ κ > 0. Then, by assumption, we have min s<κ {ϕ s + µ s P } > ϕ κ and, because µ κ P > 0, we have ϕ κ + µ κ P > ϕ κ . Hence, from (11), we
Moreover, because min s<κ {ϕ s + µ s P } > ϕ κ and ϕ κ + µ κ P > ϕ κ imply
we also have
Finally, because N < 0 and ϕ κ < ϕ κ+1 , it follows
Hence, Claim 2 is valid.
Next, we show that π = (π(v)) v∈V and λ = (λ v ) v∈V satisfy Condition (i) of Theorem 6.
, which satisfies the following condition:
Take any edge (v, u) ∈ E. We have the following three cases.
From the definition (13), we have
Moreover, by definitions (12) and (10), we have
Moreover, by the Condition (ii) of Claim 1, we have ℓ ((v, u) ) > 0 and hence, E p ̸ = ∅. Therefore, by the definition (9), we have u) ).
Hence, Claim 3 is valid.
From Claim 3, we have real numbers (π, λ) satisfying Condition (i) in Theorem 6. In addition to this, First, we show the former part of the condition. From the definition (13) and the condition (14) of
From the definition of the SCC decomposition (H 1 , . . . , H d ) of G r with the topological order in its subscripts and from the rationality of G r , we have
Finally, from the rationality of G r , we have
Therefore, the the former part of the condition is valid. For the the latter part, we have the following equivalences from almost the same argument:
Therefore, Claim 4 is valid.
Finally, we complete the proof. Note that we have shown that if the weight is a real-valued function, ℓ : E → R, there is a feasible solution of the SPPWA computed by ALGORITHM-1 (Claim 3).
Moreover, if G sub = G r then, this feasible solution preserves the consistent rational graph G r (Claim 4).
If the weight is an integer-valued function, ℓ : E → Z, then the numbers (π, λ) computed by ALGORITHM-1 are, in general, rational numbers. Hence, we modify ALGORITHM-1 slightly, so that we can have integers (π,λ) with the same properties. In essence, the following algorithm calculates the numerators and denominators of the rational numbers (π, λ), and uniformly and positively normalizes these rational numbers to be integers.
Step 1: Decompose G sub into SCCs (H 1 , . . . , H d ) as same as the Step 1 of ALGORITHM-1.
Step 2: Define P and N as same as the Step 2 of ALGORITHM-1.
Step 5 Equation (22) is obvious since ϕ 1 = 1 = α 1 and µ 1 = 1 = β 1 . We show Equation (23) by induction.
The case κ = 2 follows, from the definitions α 2 := 2α 1 + β 1 P , β 2 := 2α 1 − α 2 , (11), and (12), as Remark 1: As we see in the proof above, if we set G sub = G np , we can compute a feasible solution of the SPPWA, (π, λ), for a real-valued feasible instance, (G, ℓ : E → R), by ALGORITHM-1. If we need an integer solution for an integer-valued feasible instance, (G, ℓ : E → Z), we can compute one by ALGORITHM-2. Moreover, if we set G sub = G r we can compute a solution, which preserves the consistent rational graph G r .
Remark 2:
The complexity of ALGORITHM-1 is O(n 2 ), where n is the number of vertices of G = (V, E), given that we can find a maximum (or a minimum) value of given κ numbers in O(κ) time. 
